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NW. TURNER, Warden, 
h State Pr is on, et al. , 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Willie Folkes, appeals from an 
.er denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
By order dated May 14, 1968, accompanied by Find- , 
s 0£ Fact and Conclusions of Law, bearing the same 
' 2 
a, the trial court, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, 
~'denied appellant's petition for a writ of 
eas corpus. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the trial court's order 
ying appellant 1 s petition for a writ of habeas 
pus should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent State of Utah submits the follow-
statement of facts as being more consistent with 
t the record reveals. 
For the sake of clarity a distinction is made in 
following sequence of events between those facts 
wn specifically from the transcript of the hearing 
the subject case and those facts drawn from the re-
nder of the record. The former will be marked 11 T 11 , 
the latter 11 R 11 • 
3 
on October 11, 1966, the appellant was released 
arole from the Utah State Pr is on ( T. 6) • On or 
t April 3, 1967, while still on parole (T. 7), 
appellant aided and abetted one Carol Ann Williams 
:scape from the Utah State Mental Hospital at or 
tt which time he was returned to and confined in 
Utah State Prison (T.8). The aforementioned aid-
and abetting resulted shortly thereafter in the 
ll and conviction of the appellant in Orem City 
rt, Utah (R.13). 
Approximately three weeks following the appel- · 
t's reconfinement, appellant's parole was formally 
~ed (May 24, 1967) (T.9). Prior to said revoca-
nappellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus 
the Fourth Judicial District. On July 25, 1967, 
.lowing the hearing on said petition, the appellant I 
i 
• 0rdered releised and his Orem City Court conviction1 
! 
4 
~red a nullity on the grounds that the Orem City 
~lacked proper jurisdiction to try the case (R.13). 
The appellant was thereafter properly tried on 
iary 24, 1968, in the Fourth Judicial District on 
aforementioned charge of aiding and abetting an 
~pe from the State Mental Hospital. The trial re-
~d in the conviction of appellant and an 80 day 
son sentence. This sentence was suspended, however, 
the appellant released since appellant had already 
n imprisoned in excess of 80 days as a result of 
~ided Orem City conviction (R.12,13). 
On or about January 25, 1968, approximately one 
after the appellant• s release, appellant allegedly ~ 
~lted and battered his wife, breaking her jaw (R.11;; 
1, i2). On February 8, 1968, the appellant was re-
ned to the Utah State Prison, and on February 21, 
B, appellant• s ·parole was formally revoked by the 'I 
5 
d of pardons (T.13). It is not clear from the 
rd to what degree this alleged assault and bat-
was considered by the board, since the board 
,gnized that there had been neither a trial nor a 
'let.ion on the alleged assault and battery (R.11). 
~s there an admission of guilt before the board 
te appellant (R.11). At the time of the board's 
:i:lg, however, the appellant's conviction in the 
~h Judicial District was specifically referred to 
;rounds for revocation (R.11). 
The appellant petitioned a second time for re-
se on a writ of habeas corpus, on this occasion in 
T!1ird Judie ial District. Said petition was heard 
~O\.\t a jury on the 25th day of April, 1968, before 
rWnorable Joseph G. Jeppson. The plaintiff ap-
red in person and was represented by Robert Van 
\7€[, Attorney at Law. The defendant, John W. Turner,, 
6 
en, Utah State Prison, was represented by LeRoy s. 
nd, Assistant Attorney General. Pursuant to this 
·ing, the appellant's petition was denied on May 
~68 (R.14). An appeal from denial of the peti-
1 was filed by appellant on May 20, 1968. 
The remainder of the respondent's statement of 
:s is in essence a summation of the transcript of 
trial court whose judgment is the object of this 
eal. It is of necessity repetitive in part as to 
ters of testimony. 
During the hearing of April 25, 1968, Mr. Axland, 
nney for the plaintiff, initially moved for dis-
5al on the grounds that there was at that time 
ling before the Utah Supreme Court, an appeal on 
afurementioned conviction of the appellant in the 
r~ Judicial District (t.3). The court denied the 
ivn Lo dismiss ( T. 5) , presumably on the basis, as 
7 
:ed by the attorney for appellant, that "this peti-
181 for writ of Habeas Corpus does not seek to 
iew the conviction, but seeks to review the hold 
:h has been adjudicated through the Board of Pardons, 
llting in his confinement at the Utah State Prison. 11 
3). The question remained before the court as to 
tter or not the parole of appellant was properly 
minated (T.5). 
Mr. Lawrence Morris, Executive Secretary of the 
hState Board of Pardons was thereupon called as 
1itness on behalf of the appellant. The witness 
tified on direct examination, that "upon receipt 
the parole violation report submitted by the Adult 
bat ion and Parole Department, the Board issued a 
·rant ordering Mr. (Willie) Folkes returned to prison 
· :or him to be scheduled at the next meeting of 
board for a parole violation. 11 (T.8). The witness 
.; 
8 
r tcstif ied that "the Board reviewed the infor-
o:-i they had; they revoked the parole of Mr. Folkes 
.. " (T.9), the effective date of revocation being 
24, 1967. The information referred to by the 
.ess and as submitted by the Adult Probation and 
1le Department was specifically the conviction of 
!llant in Orem City Court. The witness further 
::..fied that following said hearing and revocation 
larole the Board received an order dated July 25, 
1, signed by the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge, 
tth Judicial District ordering the release of the 
:lla,1t, and ·that 11based upon the fact the convic-
l had been set aside, they (the board) reinstated 
or; parole. We heard nothing further from the mat.-
until he was convicted in the Fourth Judicial Dis-
'~ C I ·- 01.<.rt on the charge. ' (T.9,10). 
Upon further questioning by the attorney for 
9 
J:::..fL .Mr. Morris testified that "some time shortly 
c:o February 21, 1968, the Board was again advised 
;;,e Aciult Probation and Parole Department (that) 
;:il:"'c:s had been convicted in Fourth Judicial Dis-
:t court, and that he was involved in the assault 
~s former wife on January 25, 1968. Based upon 
1 ~n£orrnation, the Board again issued a warrant 
;,~s return • • • • 11 ( T .10) which was executed 
r:..2ry 9, 1968. A second parole violation hearing 
,,t:lO. on April 25, 1968. A photo copy of the trans-
p::')n of said parole violation hearing was entered· 
P~o.ir1tiff 1 s exhibit# 1 (T.10, R.11). Pertinent 
L::s of this transcript were read into the record :!: 
b: subject habeas corpus hearing, in particular, 
:::.tement of George Latimer, chairman and one of 
~::eEO members of the Board. 11 ••• we have signed 
<: :c,1dicating your (appellant's) wife suffered '. '. 
10 
~sn jaw, and whether you did it or not is some-
as else. we have no conviction on that, so for 
t 1me being, we will consider the first one refer-
J to the conviction (in the Fourth Judicial District) 
the aiding and abetting question. 11 
During further examination of Mr. Morris by the 
orney for the plaintiff-appellant, Mr. Van Seiver 
td: 
Q. Now do you have an opinion of the 
reason why Mr. Folkes was revoked by the 
Board of Pardons, the second time? 
A. Again, I would have to state my opin-
ion was the board apparently construed the 
conviction as a serious enough violation 
to return him to the institution (T.12). 
Dliting the cross examination of Mr. Morris by Mr. 
lr,:, it was established that Mr. Morris was an 
11 
ir::.st.cative officer, not a member of the Board of 
dc:is and therefore had no "controlling voice in 
oJtcoma of a parole revocation hearing • • • • 11 
14). 
Q. (Mr. Ax land) So you do not know then, 
do you, what went through the minds of 
these voting member? (T.14). 
A. (Mr. Morr is) No, sir. 
l1r. Lou Bertram, an agent with the Adult Pro-
11cn and Parole Department, was called as the second 
ttc two witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff-appel-
lt ar.d testified that in this parole-parolee relation-. 
lp '·1ith the appellant he had on two separate occasionf!; 
l 
r.:ested that the appellant be brought before the 
1 
: i 
tr~. In both instances the bas is for his request 
1 :~;formation of a criminal conviction of the appel-
It. -, 
::owever, the testimony leaves some doubt as to 
12 
p.:::::ran. 1 s precise information with regard to his .-
nc. :--::quest to the board ( T .17) • 
(Mr. Van Seiver) ••• did you not 
.cec:;uest he be revoked later on the Orem 
C:i.ty conviction, the first time? 
..... I requested a warrant be issued and 
returned to the Utah State Prison for a 
;arole violation hearing • 
"' . . • That was the basis of the ini-
, i:ial request, was it not? 
.-.. Yes. 
'..:. The action taken by the Orem City 
'· Was that not the same basis you made 
~:;2 :request in the second? 
··· Yes. 
13 
>e:spondent submits that since the power to re-
e~ parole rests solely with the Board of Pardons 
point of law to be discussed subsequently), and 
.t since from the record of the subject hearing the 
~recognized that the Orem City conviction had been 
1iifled prior to its second hearing on appellant's 
:ole violation (see R.11), it then follows that Mr. 
rtram' s answer as to the basis for the second re-
1st (stated above) is irrelevant, if correct. 
Both plaint if £-appellant and the State rested 
hr cases at this juncture. The court thereupon 
lie~ plaint if £-appellant's motion for relief under 
I writ of habeas corpus. 
'ihe trial court acknowledged the Orem City con-
tt~on as a nullity (R.13), but found as a conclu-
&r: 0 £ law that there had been no double jeopardy 
I 
I 
l . ~ 
lE~::. as the result of the second trial and conviction J 
14 
f :;a;1ua:ry 24, 1968, in the Fourth Judicial District 
~.l3). The court further found that the conviction 
f January 24, 1968, constituted a violation of plain-
~:£-appellant 1 s executed parole agreement, this 
es;;;ite the fact that the conviction resulted in a 
uspended sentence ( R .13, 14) • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BOARD OF PARDONS ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
n's AUTHORITY IN REVOKING THE APPELLANT Is PAROLE. 
I 
FJ:.:.:-i CODE ANN • § 7 7 -6 2 -1 7 ( 19 5 3 ) • 
With regard to the historical development and 
IEE c~ parole, attention is drawn to a leading article= 
r: '-:1e subject of the revocation of conditional libert 
ir. ~articular, to what protections, if any, circum-
t· (h- ' 
'•.v<:: its revocation. Due Process and Revocation of 
"' ' · .c;:-,dit1onal Liberty, 12 Wayne Law Review, 638-656 ~ 
15 
_,, In this article it is stated that of the ~s .. ) 1.) ; • 
i:-26 cypes of conditional releases, i.e., parole, 
·:~c.cion and conditional pardon, the use of parole 
: :~1 e states as well as in the federal system has 
1vcr existed without enabling legislation. People v. 
lf:_doni, 263 Mich. 295, 248 N.W. 627 (1933). Nor 
i sc:ch legislation authorizing the grant of condi-
ic:::;l liberty cons ti tu tionally compelled. Ughbanks 
._~-"."',strong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908); People v. Bendoni,'1 
~- Statutes providing for post-conviction parole 
tcc2dures may be characterized as acts of grace by 
he;"cate, Burris v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932) 
~v. Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938 (1960); Woodward v.: 
~I 124 Ind. 439, 24 N.E. 1047 (1890). Such 
k,:t2s are typically phrased in broad discretionary 
l:_~~cg2. 18 u.s.c. § 4203 (1948); Utah Code Ann. § 
• i' 
(1953). Moreover, the determination of 
16 
... :.c:c.h8 r or: not to grant conditional liberty is solely 
~·:::-. 1 :-i the power of the appointed authorities, whose 
ac::::.sion involves "a discretionary assessment • • . 
,\o::l what a man is and what he may become rather than 
s~::?lY what he has done. 11 Kadish, The Advocate and 
"::2 r:xpert - Counsel in the Peno - Correctional Proce 
~:. :'iinn. L. Rev. 813 ( 1961). 
It appears that the appellant bases his appeal 
le:. an alleged denial of due process and equal protec-
'~~c,~. of the law. Specifically: 
1. It is alleged that appellant was twice pun~.' 
:s~,ed for the same crime. 
2. It is alleged that appellant was not advise 
~llie right to have benefit of counsel during the 
~~cation proceedings against him, nor was he repre-




It is alleged that appellant's parole 
' 
; ,.~lawfully revoked in that said revocation lacked 
; ;.::sis other than a mere whim of the Board of 
' T:-ie respondent denies any violation of due pro-
~~:equal protection of the law in all matters 
ie\'c.r.t to appellant 1 s cause. 
I i 
r J.• In answer to the matter of alleged double 
i::o[dy, respondent refers to the first conclusion 
l~·,.; as made and entered by the Third Judicial Dis-
k: Court of trial, the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppsen 
islding. "That there has in fact been no double 
i~~rdy raised against this petitioner in that the 
h:proceeding in Orem City was declared on or about 
1, " -
' ~J, 1967, by the Honorable Allen Sorenson, dis-
':· '.' :·- JUClge of the Fourth Judicial District, to be a 
I 
l -.. " ( ) ·--~. R.3 • Respondent asks that the trial court 
18 
, ~ra.ined in its judgment on this issue • .. -' - --
2. In answer to the question of whether or not 
oe~J.c.nt has the right to be represented by counsel 
:~.:~ parole revocation proceedings or to what degree, 
c.:~/, there exists a duty of the Board so to advise 
pt~l.ant of such right, respondent against refers to 
~·ic.ynE: Law Review 652-654 ( 1966) which specifically 
bsses this issue and its various treatment, 
. the states are further re-
stricted by the equal protection 
clause. This constitutional right 
is significant in those states as-
signing different rights in revoca-
tion proceedings involving different 
types of conditional liberty. Inas-
much as the types of conditional 
liberty are different in name and 
derivation only, and have the same 
substantive characteristics, legis-
lation allowing counsel in probation 
revocation hearings but not parole 
revocation hearings arguably would 
be a denial of equal protection to 
the parolee • • • • 
19 
There would appear to be no rea-
son for a difference in the pro-
tection of the rights granted a 
parolee as distinguished from 
those granted a probationer. With-
out such reason, legislation estab-
lishing such dichotomy might be 
considered arbitrary and violative 
of equal protection. 
The strongest case for the applica-
tion of equal protection involves 
the indigent defendant. Most stat-
utes allowing for counsel at revo-
cation hearings limit such right to 
~ounsel of one's own choice', i.e., 
M.ich. Comp. Laws § 791. 240 ( 1948) , 
Mich. Stat. Ann.§ 28~2310 (1954). 
The equal protection argument has 
been dismissed on the theory that 
G-idPOD v. Woinwrjgbj:.., 372 U.S. 335 
(1963) which established the right 
to appointed counsel at felony trials 
and Massiah v. United. States, 377 U. 
S. 201 (1964) extending this right 
to all stages of the criminal pro-
ceedings, are inapplicable to revo-
cation hearings, which are not crim-
inal prosecutions. Jones v. Rivers, 
338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964). How-
ever, Chief Judge Sobeloff, in a 
concurring opinion, at 876, suggests 
that distinctions between indigents 
20 
and those with means is not war-
ranted in view of Griffin v. Il-
linois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) .•• 
(the) argument that counsel must 
be provided to an indigent proba-
tioner or parolee is not based on 
a theory that a revocation hearing 
is a criminal prosecution. It 
merely rests on the proposition 
that where a statute provides for 
counsel of one's choice, a prisoner 
unable to hire private counsel has 
a right to have counsel appointed. 
Hoffman v~ State, 404 P.2d 644 
(Alaska 1965). In other words, 
the argument recognizes that a 
state need not make any provision 
for counsel at revocation hearings 
since Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 
490 (1935) obviates such require-
ment. However, if the state does 
make such provision it must apply 
to the indigent as well or consti-
tute a denial of equal protection 
of the laws. 
• o o In states granting a hearing 
but not detailing the incidental 
rights, the defendant is usually 
entitled to present witnesses, cross-
examine adverse witnesses, and obtain 
the aid of counsel. States having 
no explicit statutory provisions 
21 
referring to notice and hear-
ing normally provide a hearing 
although it is often just an 
informal interview. Thus, ir-
respective of the lack of con-
stitutional compulsion, most 
states provide those rights 
associated with procedural due 
process and considered funda-
mental to a deprivation of lib-
erty. 
Uta'.1 Code Ann. § 77-62-17 does not specifically 
~:a parolee right to a hearing prior to revoca-
1:. o: parole. 11 The Board of Pardons is empowered 
: 0::.1inate at any time, the parole of any offender. 11 
t '-'·Harris, 108 U. 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945) states, 1 
I =.'.'1nciple that the Board has. power .to revoke parole 
t:.jc;: affording prisoner any hearing. As a matter 
:;:~v:lege but not right, Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-16 
1:-;_ . 
· ' states that the "board of pardons shall permit 
i ~.::::ender re imprisoned for parole violation to be 
t~ :c its next regular meeting." Respondent submitsf 
22 
~~i ~ot providing for the right to a hearing it 
~>:: tr.at the State of Utah is effectively removed 
t~ ;.:.y question of equal protection under the laws, 
e~:::~call.y with regard to the allegation of the 
f=~~::.:.-: that he was unlawfully denied benefit of 
t ,,_ · p ol t · h · 1 t .. ~;; ... a u:is ar e revoca ion earing. Respondent 
a-:::2t s::.:i::ni ts that the laws of the State of Utah 
-··- s'J.!::J ect appeal is factually and procedurally 
:~s::..:-::;'J..:..shed from ~~erl'\Pa v. Rhay, 389 U .s. 128, 
:: S. Ct. 254 ( 1967), wherein the petitioner was 
:: .. :..c::e6. o:: an of::ense upon a plea of guilty 
1 ::::":-2c, \:2. t~ the advise of court-appointed counsel· 
:~.~ :'.'.e::::-eafter put on probation. Sentence was de-
::::-~·22. a.cco:::::ding to Washington Law. Subsequently, 
:: '°- :-.ea.:c.:::..::-ig in wnich petitioner was not represente< 
< .:::...::-.sel, -=he court revoked petitioner 1 s proba-
:-=:. c.:.C.. :;:;c.s sea. sentence. The Supreme Court of the , 
:::.:2 o:: ~·;ashington O.enied petition for writ of 
:.::2::.s ccrpus, but the Supre::ie Court of the United 
::::.-:e:.:o ::-eversed on writ of certiori, holding that 
-. :.. :c.se ~~ere an accused agreed to plea guilty, 
'~:.::_~;-. ::-.e ::ad a valid defense, because he was 
=---:::::: ,?.::'.'o~atio:i., absence of counsel at the iinposi 
--= :.;-.e C.e:::erred sentence might well result in I 
"- ~ : :: ~ -= -- ~- t::-.e right to appeal. 
23 
1 :ot place a duty on the Board of Pardons to 
1: 02 -c.r1e parolee of any right to counsel at his re-
:2~1on hearing in that (1) the code of criminal pro-
jc2 is silent on the matter, and ( 2) as previously 
1":2d 1 there exists no right, as such, to a revo-
~nhearing. Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (1968) 
1c1rc.; Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (1968) 
t;, 2irc.; Gonzales v. Patterson, 3 70 F. 2d 94 ( 1966) 
~' Circ. 
3. In answer to the appellant's claim that his 
Jc~2 i·1as revoked at the whim of the Board of Pardons 
! ~i1erefore lacked any proper basis, the respondent 
IE':s the courts attention once again to the tran-
k;: of the trial court where in two possible bases 
r ~2-id revocation are recorded. One is the alleged 
~lt and battery of the appellant's wife. The 
t~ :ic=.J at the time of appellant's revocation hearing 
24 
._ o·~ records indicating (his) wife suffered a broken !~:··-~ 
II However, the Board apparently placed f • • • • 
~:~e 1 f any weight on this charge since they had 
, .. no conviction on that. 11 (T.12). As to the 
to:.c possible basis for revocation, specifically 
1~:p2llant 1 s conviction dated January 24, 1968, in 
l?ou:th Judicial District Court, State of Utah, of 
~ cci.me of aiding and abetting an escape from the 
~.State Hospital (R.14), this is a matter of record 
~ 2s such is an irrefutable basis for revocation of 
Furthermore, it is clear that at the time 
1 a~?ellant 1 s revocation hearing, the Board had 
L:ic knowledge of said conviction and put great 
~~upon it as grounds for appellant's parole re-
ta::o:, (R.11 - the transcript of said parole viola-
t: . . ~ec.ring). Respondent maintains that it is clear 
t ·-~·.e record. that the Board 1 s consideration of 
, I 
25 
case and its subsequent decision to revoke 
.. , J. IS 1€~.:.::n~ parole were not arbitrary or in any sense 
1 rr:ar:J..festation of mere whim. Therefore, there was 
viol2tion of due process by the Board of Pardons. 
Ir.deed, an effective conditional liberty system 
li:::;;.tely depends upon fair treatment of the parolee, 
l ti:e threat of arbitrary revocation does not en-
~ra;e or aid the process of rehabilitation of the 
I 
~Jtionally released prisoner. See Burns v. United 
I 
~I 287 U. S • 216 ( 19 3 2) ; 6 5 Harv. L. Rev. 3 09 ( 19 51: 
i 
l1·,· 1re L t 1 .. .l .i. • 
I 
Rev. 650. The discretionary power of the· 
~c is broad but not unlimited, and the reversal of 
l ~·:ocation may be the result of its misuse. Swan v. 
' ~' 200 Md. 420, 90 A.2d 690 (1952); United States 
~De L 11cie v. O'Donover, 82 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. 
,. l948), affirmed, 178 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1949), 
I 
~-, 340 U.S. 886 (1950). Examples of abuse 
·1 
26 
c:. ~= 11,ould call for revocation are "suspicion of 
i:c:.(..uct not proven," United States v. Van Riper, 
:.2d 816 (2nd Cir. 1938) wherein it is stated 
1: 2.lthough the state normally bears the burden of 
~·._ .. s a violation, "no probation statute specifies 
'~egree of proof necessary to meet this burden." 
b. L. Rev. 311, 332 (1959) as cited in 12 Wayne 
i 
i;ev. 651. Normally, the evidence required to re-
k1s that which satisfies the judge; proof beyond 
le"~:ma:Ole doubt is not required. Manning v. United 
I 
l 
~, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1947); Blaylock v. State. 
I 
I 
i·:~ .. ;pp. 880, 78 S.E.2d 537 (1953), cited in 12 
r; L, Rev. 651. It is submitted that these limita-
' 
h ::1ere not violated by the trial court, and that 
<::::ectly found no whim or caprice by the Board of 
r~:o l[l i tS revocation Of appellant IS parole• 
~:-,e Law of Utah makes it clear that the Board of 
27 
~;:, 3 of the State of Utah is a constitutionally ,. 
ic~~:.s!1ed body, Utah Const. art. 7, § 12, with 
IC~~sive authority to remit fines and foreitures, 
and grant pardons after convic-
II See also Cardico v. Davis, 91 U. 323, jr.S • • , • 
P.~c 216 ( 19 3 7) • The statutes of this state grant 
lr:cc:.rd of Pardons broad discretionary powers to 
be paroles and re incarcerate parolees. "All 
~::.2rs released on parole, pursuant to the pro-
~~s hereof, shall remain in the legal custody and 
I 
~: c.:ontrol of the chief adult parole and adult pro:.. 
L~officer, and shall be subject at any time to 
rc:o.~en to the ins ti tut ion from which he was paroled 
I~- ~'"en time as his sentence is terminated. Full 
~t0 retake and reimprison any convict upon parole 
' fr"- -
i'<·nred upon the board of pardons, whose written 
~:~<=rt if ied by its secretary shall be sufficient 
28 
z_ .. ·:: £or all officers authorized to make arrests, 
:::::P-r persons named therein, to return to actual 
r:cy any such prisoner. 11 Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-16 
1·. I ,:~) . This statute is essentially a restatement 
:: ?rinciple of law set out in McCoy v. Harris, 108 
1
;jl, 160 P.2d 721 (1945) which states that "viola-
' ~of rules for the conduct of a paroled prisoner 
,:~::!ilar to a violation of rules within the prison 
I 
':onstitutes an abuse of the privilege for which 
, J:1vilege may be withdrawn, and the rules confer 
l~~;al right." 
CONCLUSION 
Tbe respondent maintains that on the basis of 
I 
'=~cts of this case, the laws of this State, and 
~:~:.:.ng continuum of the law of the United States, 
1=~ cc.n be little doubt that the Board of Pardons 
~. ··"=ll within the scope of its authority in re-
l-' I ,. : tne parole of the appellant. The respondent 
29 
i 
J:;::Jre submits that the trial court's order deny-
~ .:.:]?dlant' s petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
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